The early literature on research contests stressed the advantages of a fixed prize in inspiring R&D effort. More recently the focus has moved towards endogenizing the rewards to research activity in these tournament settings, since this can induce extra effort or enhance the surplus of the buyer. We focus on a research contest as a means of selecting a partner for an R&D enterprise, in an informational setting in which the established providers of R&D services know more about each others' relative capabilities than does the buyer/sponsor. This asymmetry creates a source of inefficiency if a rank order contest is used as a selection device; we show how the contest can be modified to improve selection efficiency, while maintaining its simplicity (as only ordinal information is required). The modification that we suggest involves endogenizing the prizes that are awarded contingent upon whether a contestant wins or loses the contest. Furthermore, the payment system and the selection mechanism are detail free.
Introduction
In the funding of commercial research and development (R&D) projects, payment structures have long been used that comprise a fixed fee and a payment contingent upon some pre-specified realization or event. Windus and Schiffel (1976) present a summary of funding practice by public bodies in several countries in which a common element is a fixed level of funding, and a variable component comprising a proportion of the profit that the developing firm can keep in the event of a commercially viable innovation. Early models of R&D contests involved a sponsor offering a fixed prize for an innovation (Taylor, 1995, and Fullerton and McAfee, 1999) . Recently there has been a move away from fixed-prize research contests, as advocated by Che and Gale (2003) , who give the following examples of contests in which endogenous prizes have been used: (i) in the procurement of a high-speed train system in Korea, firms proposed designs and prices for these designs, (ii) grant competitions sponsored by the National Science Foundation, (iii) defense contractors often use R&D investments to produce prototypes, and then bid for the final production contract.
The focus of this paper is how a simple endogenous prize research contest can be used by a buyer to select a partner for a R&D enterprise when there is asymmetric information.
To be specific, consider a research contest in which a firm is seeking a partner in the development and subsequent marketing of a new product. Selecting the correct partner for this venture would be an obvious aim here, but the established providers of R&D services are likely to know more about each others' capabilities than a potential sponsor.
Hence a contest may be instigated to gauge the suitability of different research laboratories for this task. Our analysis presents a simple, detail-free method for selecting the most suitable partner by setting up the correct menu of rewards in a simple rank-order contract. A high quality partner is identified as requiring a larger fee (share of the profits) if it is successful in developing the new product, but will be willing to bear a larger proportion of the cost if unsuccessful than would a less able competitor. Such costsharing arrangements in R&D have long been in existence in several countries (see Keck, 1988) . Fullerton et al. (2002) note that one benefit with a more flexible prize schedule is that the contest designer is then relieved of the burden of calculating the correct level of the fixed prize.
1 In the context of military acquisitions, Fullerton (1995) has suggested that a contractor may submit a proposal that incorporates some element of an appropriate reward for his efforts; our analysis gives a formal basis for this proposal.
Our work builds upon that of Che and Gale (2003) and Fullerton et al. (2002) who have analyzed models of research contests in which the prize for winning is set by means of an auction mechanism. Firms compete in terms of the quality of their innovation and the price that they require for selling it, and the buyer's aim in both of these models is to maximize his surplus. The role of contests as an incentive device has been widely analyzed in the literature, especially relating to the internal labour market. 2 In this paper, we concentrate on a contest as a selection device, in which the aim is to identify the best individual, firm, or research team for a specific task. Indeed in much of the contest and tournament literature selection has not been an issue since participants are assumed to be symmetric ex ante so that the contest designer is indifferent as to the identity of the agent that wins the contest. However, allocating the contest prize to the most suitable participant is an issue that arises in research contests, internal labour markets, and other applications.
3
A selection problem arises in a contest if the participants have different ability potential.
Heterogeneity has been shown to disturb the contest as an incentive device, and may also disturb it as a selection device. 4 Lazear and Rosen (1981) and O'Keeffe, Viscusi and
Zeckhauser (1984) demonstrate that a favourite often has weak incentives to exert effort if he faces an underdog due to the fact that he has good chances to win the contest even at a modest effort level. To reestablish the first best effort incentives, Lazear and Rosen (1981) consider handicapping, as well as a process of self-selection of contestants into different leagues or contests. Handicapping is also used by Che and Gale (2003) in their analysis of optimal research contests when firms are asymmetric and this asymmetry is common knowledge. 5 Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988) and Yun (1997) consider the self-selection of participants into parallel contests; in the former, workers self-select and the prize received depends upon a comparison with workers from the lowest ability contest (i.e. between cohorts), and the latter employs self-selection of two types in which the prize is awarded purely on the basis of a within-cohort comparison.
6
The real problem in selection contests arises if the principal is unaware of the potential heterogeneity of the contestants, in which case handicapping is ruled out as a mechanism.
Furthermore, if the contestants know more about each other's potential ability than the principal knows, the contest is biased. We believe that this informational asymmetry fits many real life situations well. In a research contest, the providers of R&D services would know more about each others' relative capabilities than would a potential buyer.
This generates an asymmetry, which becomes a source of inefficiency, if a rank order contest is used as a selection device. As an illustration, consider a research contest in which an R&D provider with high expected ability faces an opponent that it assesses to be of lower ability. In such a situation, the high ability team has an incentive to slack off in the contest. This behavior arises precisely because it expects to meet an inferior opponent; the high ability team thus reduces its effort and its associated cost. If the R&D team with low expected ability turns out to be more capable than expected, then it benefits from the opponent's tendency to slack off, and adopts a more aggressive stance.
As a result, the high ability contestant occasionally loses to inferior opponents. Hence, in instances where the agents are better informed than the principal, there is a risk of selecting an inferior agent.
7
It follows that running a fair contest (a contest that is symmetric with respect to the permutations of the contestants) does not yield first best selection in the case of heterogeneous contestants. However running a biased contest requires information that is often not available to the principal. In the present paper, we propose an alternative procedure based on endogenous prizes. The principal only has access to an ordinal comparison of the contest variable, but can make the reward contingent upon winning or losing. The main conclusion is that the principal can improve selection efficiency by letting each contestant trade off a higher winning prize at the cost of a reduction in the losing prize. 8 The intuition is that a contestant who faces an opponent that he expects to be of low ability, is willing to accept a large reduction in the losing prize for a given increase in the winning prize, simply because his overall winning probability is higher.
On the other hand, a contestant who faces an opponent he believes to be of high ability is better off choosing a smaller gap. Consequently, giving each contestant the option of increasing his winning prize at the cost of a reduction in the losing prize, affects his stake in the contest, and hence his willingness to compete fiercely. This counteracts the selection bias described above; in our modified contest the bidding incentives of a high ability contestant are reinforced since he has more to win.
9
In Clark and Riis (2001), we analysed how a bonus system can be used in order to reduce the risk of selecting the inferior agent in a contest. That is, by carrying out ordinal comparisons of the winner's effort with certain test standards, and rewarding the winner 7 This bias is acknowledged in the literature; the result is shown by for instance Amann and Leininger (1996) . 8 The payment structure that we suggest is simple and detail-free.
9 O'Keeffe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984) examine a related incentive mechanism in their discussion of self-sorting into leagues of high ability versus low ability. They point out that the "climbing-incentives", which means that low ability types infiltrate "high -ability contests", can be dampened by increasing the prize spread in the high ability contest (obviously, low ability types receive the loser prize more frequently). Another example is given by Landers et al. (1996) who focus on promotion decisions in law firms where there is an incentive to promote associates who have a propensity to work very hard. "Rat race" equilibrium occurs since the principal may use work hours as a selection device. By properly designing "wage-hours" packages, the principal may separate workers with low and high disutility of work.
adequately if these are passed, we demonstrated that the bias in favour of agents with low expected capability disappears. First-best selection is achieved, albeit under a restricted set of probability distributions: it is assumed that abilities are drawn from two uniform distributions that are identical up to a location shift. The model that we present in this paper is a significant generalization of this work.
10
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 recaps the selection bias that occurs in a fixed prize contest, while Section 4 presents a prize structure that implements perfect selection. Brief conclusions are offered in Section 5.
The model.
Consider a two-player contest, in which the contestant who submits the largest bid wins, and all bids are forfeited. The two contestants are recruited from two populations with The contestant who makes the largest bid x wins and receives a prize W, whereas the loser receives a prize w. The difference m := W-w denotes the prize premium. In the case of a draw, each contestant wins with a probability equal to 0.5.
Since the aim of the principal is to select the agent of highest ability, it is instructive to first characterize the selection inefficiency that occurs in the fixed prize contest, where W and w are exogenously given (Section 3). Then we will show how a prize menu m(W) can be designed in order to ensure selection efficiency (Section 4). The idea is that each contestant, in addition to making a bid x, chooses an individual prize premium from the menu m(W).
The fixed prize contest.
In the fixed prize contest, the participant that submits the highest bid wins a prize of 
(1 Pr( ))
(1 
As shown in the Appendix, from the real theory of differential equations it follows that a
v of the system (3) exists, where the equilibrium bidding functions are strictly increasing above zero, have a common ending point x and where at most one agent bids zero with a strictly positive probability.
Proposition 1 indicates the selection inefficiency in the fixed prize contest, by showing that the equilibrium bid function for type L lies everywhere above that of the expectedly superior opponent.
Proposition 1: For all v < v then b L (v) > b H (v).

Proof:
, the proposition follows.
The endogenous prize contest
If units of ability were measurable and comparable, one might consider establishing a direct mechanism in which the contestants truthfully reported their types on a cardinal scale. Based on these reports, the contest could be modified such that a first-best selection was implemented. However, a direct mechanism requires considerably more information than a contest (in addition, qualitatively different information is demanded, as reports have to be given on a cardinal scale). An attractive feature of rank order contests is that the required amount of information required is limited; decisions are made on the basis of ordinal information only.
There are restrictions that limit the set of feasible mechanisms; the principal receives only ordinal information on bids, and he does not know which contestant, if any, is of higher expected ability. Hence the distribution of prizes can only be conditioned on whether a contestant wins or loses. Therefore, we modify the contest by introducing the choice of prize structure as part of the contest. To make the model as simple as possible, we assume the two contestants simultaneously submit, 1) a bid x and 2) a choice of prize premium from a menu m(W 
Differentiating π H with respect to W H and v L c gives the first order conditions:
Inserting H's preferred winning prize W i (v) from (5b) and the equilibrium correspondence function e(v) into (5a), and doing the same for player L, yields the following system of two differential equations:
which has a simple interpretation: perfect selection requires that two contestants of equal abilities have the same bidding incentives at the margin. This means that a type L, of ability v, chooses a prize premium m(W L (v)), which is proportional to the prize premium m (W H (v) ) a type H of exactly the same ability v would choose, with the relative density
We will now demonstrate that there indeed exists a menu m(W) such that the contest yields efficient selection independent of the truncation levels v H and v L . Since it follows from (5b) that W H is strictly increasing in the win probability,
function is assumed to be increasing strictly convex) two contestants with equal win probabilities choose equal prize premiums. That is, ( )
, where the index k indicates the degree of contest asymmetry, defined by
Thus k is a number between 0 and 1, where a low k implies high degree of asymmetry.
≡ k per definition we can write (7) as follows:
Furthermore from the first order condition (5b), it follows that
Combining (8) and (9) 
14 Observe there is a simple relationship between h k (v) and k, since The point here is that a contestant who considers his competitor to be an "underdog", is willing to accept a small increase in the prize received as a winner as compensation for a given reduction in the losing prize w, simply because his winning probability is large.
Consequently, giving each contestant the option of increasing the winning prize at the cost of decreasing the losing prize affects the bidding incentives. This counteracts the incentive bias that typically occurs in asymmetric contests, where the bidding incentives of "top-dogs" are poor due to the high winning probability. In our modified contest the bidding incentives of an expected high ability player are reinforced since he has more to win. Furthermore, the prize menu and the selection mechanism are detail-free.
Conclusion
The main theoretical contribution of this paper is that a principal can improve selection efficiency in a contest by allowing the contestants to influence the remuneration scheme.
The solution that we have presented is simple since it involves only an ordinal comparison of the contest variable, and the reward schedule is independent of the specific details of the models such as the distribution of players' types. Specifically, letting the contestants trade off a higher winning prize at the cost of a lower losing prize achieves the desired result. We have argued that the results may be of use in the design of certain research contests in which a fixed reward cannot achieve all of the sponsor's aims.
In our analysis, we have assumed that the contestants' abilities are drawn from two truncated probability distributions, where the underlying distribution is the same for the two contestants. A more general approach would be to specify a larger set of probability functions from which the two specific distributions F L and F H are drawn. In the more general case, perfect selection efficiency is not achievable. Still, an important insight holds, namely that allowing the contestants to increase their stakes in the contest tends to reduce the likelihood of selection inefficiency. The bidding incentives for an expectedly high ability player are reinforced, hence the chance that he loses against inferior opponents decreases. Even though the fine-tuning that is achievable in the case with a common underlying distribution cannot be realized in the general case, selection efficiency is typically improved compared to the fixed prize contest; see the discussion in Riis (2003) .
The specific example that we have used to motivate our results has been related to the cofunding of R&D enterprise, but it should be clear that our results could equally as well be applied to an internal labour markets. Another application of our analysis relates to environmental damage as described by Liston-Heyes (2001) who considers a (full information) contest between a firm that wants to produce a product that will damage the environment and an environmental pressure group that wants to stop this development. The firm chooses its own level of profit from the proposed project strategically in order to increase its chances of being allowed to proceed with the development. In equilibrium, this is shown to reduce the amount of environmental damage that occurs compared to the fixed prize (profit) case. As an extension of this, one can imagine a situation with two firms that compete for the product development, and that their ability to limit environmental damage is unknown to the regulator. Indeed, it is not unthinkable that the regulator may not even know which of the competitors is expected to have the better ability. Given that the firm of higher ability will have lower marginal cost of "selling" its product to the regulator through marketing and lobbying campaigns, a smart move for the regulator may be to allow an endogenization of the prize structure along the lines that we have suggested. A firm that will be good at limiting environmental damage from the new development can signal this by choosing a high profit level if successful (by, for example, that the regulator allows access to the market at a low price), against a low level if it is not.
Appendix.
We first show that equilibrium bidding functions are: I) strictly increasing above zero, II) have a common ending point and III) that at most one firm may bid zero with a strictly positive probability.
I) Assume an interval [v',v''] exists at which all L types in this interval bid a given amount z. Hence, type H's payoff function is discontinuous and jumps upwards at x H = z.
Consequently, type H does not make a bid just below z. Thus z may not be L's best reply since type L of type v ∈ [v',v''] may reduce his bid without reducing the winning probability. II) The ending points are common since no firm bids strictly more than the largest potential amount the competitor bids. III) At most one firm may bid zero with a strictly positive probability; otherwise each firm is better off making a small positive bid with certainty than by a zero bid.
There exists a unique solution of the system of differential equations (3) 
